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FORM VS. FUNCTION IN RULE 10B-5 
CLASS ACTIONS 
AMANDA M. ROSE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s widely anticipated decision last term in 
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.1 did little to change the 
fundamental landscape of securities fraud litigation in the United 
States. Rule 10b-52 class actions premised on the “fraud-on-the-
market” presumption of reliance may still be brought, although it is 
now clear that defendants may present evidence of lack of price 
distortion to rebut that presumption at the class certification stage. 
Halliburton does, however, raise a variety of new questions that will 
keep plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel fighting for years to 
come. Determining the answers to these questions will be expensive, 
but ultimately of little social value. This contribution to the Duke 
Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy’s symposium “Fraud 
on the Market after Halliburton II” explains why. 
The problem stems from a mismatch between the form and 
function of Rule 10b-5 class actions, a mismatch created by the 
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Basic v. Levinson, which first 
recognized the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.3 Part I 
describes how this doctrinal innovation served to untether the Rule 
10b-5 private right of action from its moorings in the common law of 
fraud, with the effect that Rule 10b-5 class actions today achieve none 
of the social benefits that flow from the common law fraud cause of 
action. Part II posits that Rule 10b-5 class actions might nevertheless 
serve a desirable social function, to the extent they produce new 
information about managerial misbehavior that is valuable to 
shareholders and regulators, and the value of that information 
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 1.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 2.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951). 
 3.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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exceeds the costs of its production. Part III explains that the questions 
raised by Halliburton, as well some of the most common issues that 
litigants fight over in Rule 10b-5 class actions, serve merely to 
increase litigation costs without producing any offsetting 
informational benefits. Part IV concludes by suggesting that Rule 10b-
5 class actions be replaced with an alternative—and likely more 
efficient—information-production mechanism, namely the SEC’s new 
Whistleblower Bounty Program. 
I.  THE BREAK WITH THE COMMON LAW 
Consider a simple fact pattern for a common law fraud action, one 
involving the sale of securities: Promoter A induces Couple B to 
invest in a company he owns by misrepresenting material facts about 
the company.  The common law fraud cause of action would allow 
Couple B to sue Promoter A to recover any out-of-pocket losses 
sustained that are causally related to the fraud, assuming the couple 
could prove that they actually relied on the promoter’s misstatements 
when they entered into the transaction.4 
The fact that this cause of action is available to fraud victims like 
Couple B does important work to promote voluntary exchange in a 
market economy. First, the threat of having to pay damages in such a 
suit encourages would-be fraudsters to internalize the costs (or at 
least some of the costs) of their contemplated fraud, making it less 
profitable on an expected-value basis and therefore less likely to be 
committed. Second, by promising relief ex post, the common law 
fraud cause of action discourages potential victims from spending 
inefficiently on precautions ex ante, including by foregoing wealth-
creating transactions altogether. Finally, by requiring culpable 
defendants to compensate injured plaintiffs, the common law fraud 
cause of action also provides a mechanism for righting wrongs. 
Rule 10b-5 renders it unlawful to “make any untrue statement of 
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made . . . not misleading . . . in connection with 
the purchase or sale of securities,”5 but it does not explicitly lay out 
the elements a plaintiff must establish to recover in a private suit. This 
 
 4.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (“One who fraudulently 
makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another 
to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for 
pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”). 
 5.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1951). 
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is because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), when it 
promulgated the rule, never anticipated that the federal courts would 
recognize a private right to sue under it.6 To give shape to the 
judicially-recognized Rule 10b-5 private right of action, federal courts 
initially looked to the common law fraud cause of action for guidance, 
interpreting the elements of the implied right so as to track those of 
the storied tort—presumably with the hope and expectation that it 
would produce similar social benefits.7 In some simple cases of 
securities fraud, like the one described above, the analogy between 
common law fraud and Rule 10b-5 does in fact work well. In such 
cases, the only real difference between a common law fraud and a 
Rule 10b-5 cause of action is the latter’s broader jurisdictional reach.8 
In so-called fraud-on-the-market scenarios, however, the analogy 
fails. 
Whereas classic common law fraud cases involve privity of dealing 
and actual reliance by the plaintiff on the misstatements of the 
defendant, the typical fraud-on-the-market scenario involves agents 
of a publicly traded corporation releasing falsely positive information 
about their firm, either in SEC filings or in other public statements. 
That misleading information, in turn, influences the trading activity of 
a set of investors who actually read and rely on it (and who thus may 
be able to state a common law fraud claim). The trading activity of 
these “informed traders” then operates to inflate the price at which 
millions of passive investors, who neither read nor rely on the 
misstatements, buy shares in the company on the secondary market. 
When the truth is revealed, the stock held by these passive investors 
will decrease in value, but they will be unable to bring a common law 
fraud claim due to their lack of actual reliance on the misstatements. 
 
 6.  See Milton Freeman, Remarks at Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities 
Laws (Nov. 18, 1966), in Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 
(1967) (stating that, as originally created, Rule 10b-5 “had no relation in the Commission’s 
contemplation to private proceedings”). 
 7.  See Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[M]any of the 
principles applicable to common law suits apply by analogy to [a Rule 10b-5 suit].”). The 
elements of a private Rule 10b-5 claim are “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the 
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic 
loss; and (6) loss causation.” Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 157 (2008) (citing Dura Pharm., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005)).  
 8.  Indeed, in Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the seminal 
case that first recognized a private right to sue under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs could have 
proceeded under either the common law or Rule 10b-5; Rule 10b-5 was preferred because of the 
1934 Act’s provision for nationwide service of process. Id. at 514. 
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When first presented with private Rule 10b-5 claims based on this 
type of fact pattern, federal courts could have responded in a variety 
of ways. For example, they might have stuck by their commitment to 
the common law fraud analogy, holding that passive investors can 
find no relief under Rule 10b-5 for fraud on the market due to their 
lack of actual reliance. Alternatively, the courts might have 
recognized that these sorts of cases are fundamentally different from 
common law fraud cases and, in light of that, crafted a new and 
coherent set of elements for stating such claims. They did neither. 
Instead, in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court choose to modify 
the common law reliance requirement to facilitate fraud-on-the-
market class actions, while keeping the other elements of the Rule 
10b-5 “fraud tort” intact.9 
According to Basic, plaintiffs are entitled to a presumption of 
reliance if they can show that: (1) the alleged misrepresentations were 
publicly known, (2) they were material, (3) the stock traded in an 
efficient market, and (4) the plaintiff traded the stock between the 
time the misrepresentations were made and when the truth was 
revealed.10 Although presumptions are not foreign to the common law 
generally, or to the common law of fraud specifically, Basic did more 
than recognize a presumption. It transformed the very meaning of 
reliance. Under Basic, plaintiffs are not presumed to have relied on 
the misstatement, but rather on the integrity of the stock’s market 
price, which is itself presumed to have been distorted by the fraud. 
The reliance presumed by Basic is therefore “fundamentally 
different” from the reliance that has traditionally been required in 
common law fraud cases.11 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic might seem to the casual 
observer to have been a rather minor tweak to the common law. But 
 
 9.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 10.  Id. at 241–49. As the Basic court explained, the so-called “fraud-on-the market” 
presumption of reliance 
is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price 
of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding 
the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud 
purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. . . 
. The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of 
stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on 
misrepresentations. 
Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 11.  See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 
BUS. LAW. 507, 507–08 (2005). 
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in fact it had major ramifications. Most notably, it created a form of 
Rule 10b-5 litigation that shares none of the social virtues of common 
law fraud, raising the question of its purpose. 
Consider first the threat of damages. Unlike in a common law 
fraud case, the threat of paying damages in a Rule 10b-5 class action 
does not force would-be fraudsters to internalize the costs of their 
contemplated fraud, thereby assisting in deterrence. Why? The simple 
answer is that the individuals actually responsible for the fraud are 
essentially never forced to pay in these suits; instead, the corporation 
itself or its insurer—and, indirectly, the corporation’s innocent 
shareholders—foot the bill.12 
The harder question is why individuals are never forced to pay. 
The answer to that question takes us back to the Basic decision. By 
recognizing a new type of reliance that investors who admittedly did 
not read or rely on the alleged misstatements can establish based on 
common proof, Basic dramatically increased the number of plaintiffs 
who can sue to recover out-of-pocket damages under Rule 10b-5. At 
the same time, it facilitated the aggregation of these plaintiffs’ claims 
through the class action device.13 Basic thus had the effect of radically 
increasing the size of the potential damage awards in these suits.14 
Enormous potential damage awards, combined with the possibility of 
legal error, makes it rational for even innocent defendants to settle 
marginal cases. Against this backdrop, a corporate board’s decision to 
settle a Rule 10b-5 class action while shielding its officers from 
liability is both legal and plausibly defensible.15 
 
 12.  See, e.g., Michael Klausner et al., How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class 
Actions? An Update, 26 PROF. LIAB. UNDERWRITING SOC’Y J. 1, 1, 4 (2013) (empirical study of 
securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010, finding that the insurer paid the full 
settlement in 58% of settled cases and partially funded the settlement in another 28%; outside 
directors contributed in none of the settled cases, and officers contributed in only 2%).  
 13.  See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013) 
(“Absent the fraud-on-the-market theory [adopted in Basic], the requirement that Rule 10b-5 
plaintiffs establish reliance would ordinarily preclude certification of a class action seeking 
money damages because individual reliance issues would overwhelm questions common to the 
class.”). 
 14.  See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1999) (noting that damages in 
Rule 10b-5 class actions can amount to a substantial percentage of a corporation’s total 
capitalization). 
 15.  Agency costs may explain a board’s decision to shield individual defendants from 
liability, but so too may a genuine belief in the individuals’ innocence, or a fear that demanding 
payment might lead to over-deterrence in the future, as honest managers take steps to avoid the 
specter of liability. 
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One might respond that the threat of damages in Rule 10b-5 class 
actions still has some deterrent benefit insofar as corporations are 
forced to pay settlements, because at least this ensures that 
corporations will internalize some of the costs of fraud and perhaps 
respond by taking steps to reduce its likelihood by better monitoring 
corporate agents. The reality, however, is that when a solvent 
corporation pays, its shareholders pay, and shareholders already have 
good incentives to do what they can to prevent securities fraud, 
because they are its primary victims.16 Moreover, in addition to paying 
the settlements in Rule 10b-5 class actions, shareholders also recover 
as members of the plaintiff class, so over time, diversified 
shareholders will be on the receiving end of fraud-on-the-market class 
actions roughly as often as they are on the paying end.  As a result, 
fraud-on-the-market settlement payments will be unlikely to affect 
the behavior of diversified investors in any case. 
Just as the empty threat of paying damages in a Rule 10b-5 class 
action does not cause would-be fraudsters to internalize the costs of 
securities fraud, the promise of receiving a damage award in a Rule 
10b-5 class action does not discourage would-be victims from 
investing in precautions. Again, because diversified investors stand on 
both sides of the “v” in Rule 10b-5 class actions (as owners of the 
corporations that pay the settlements as well as members of the 
plaintiff class), settlement payments are, in the grand scheme, a wash 
to them and thus unlikely to affect their behavior.17 
Finally, and for the same reasons, Rule 10b-5 class actions can 
hardly be said to “right wrongs” in the way that common law fraud 
suits do. Instead, non-culpable parties compensate, essentially, 
themselves, for wrongs done by third parties who escape any direct 
punishment in the litigation. 
 
 16.  See Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting; How the SEC’s New Whistleblower 
Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1252–1255 
(2014) (explaining the traditional deterrence justification for corporate liability and why it fails 
in the context of Rule 10b-5 class actions).  
 17.  Moreover, as Frank Easterbook and Daniel Fischel observed long ago, diversified 
shareholders stand to profit from secondary market fraud nearly as often as they lose, so they 
have little incentive to invest in precautions even in the absence of legal relief.  See Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 
(1985). Cf. Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1679, 1688 n.29 (2011) (noting some challenges to this argument).  For a discussion of why Rule 
10b-5 class actions cannot be defended as a mechanism for compensating non-diversified 
information traders, see Rose, supra note 16 at 1244 n.38, and references cited therein. 
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II.  A MODERN RATIONALE FOR FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET SUITS 
Just because fraud-on-the-market class actions do not produce the 
same social benefits as common law fraud suits does not necessarily 
mean that they are worthless. As I have argued elsewhere, fraud-on-
the-market class actions might nevertheless be defended because they 
have the capacity to produce information that is valuable to 
shareholders and regulators.18 
This argument begins with the recognition that, although 
diversified shareholders have natural incentives to cause firms in their 
portfolio to take reasonable steps to deter fraud-on-the-market, it is 
ultimately the board of directors that controls a corporation’s 
operations, and the board is differently positioned: 
Whereas diversified shareholders are likely to lose as often as they 
win from secondary market fraud, and thus do not stand to profit 
from its distributional consequences, directors—and the officers to 
whom they may feel beholden—are positioned differently. They 
have considerable wealth tied up in the particular firms they serve, 
including stock, expected salary, and reputational capital. If left 
unpunished, fraud-on-the-market could help to enhance that 
wealth.19 
A threat of sanction may therefore be necessary to prompt 
directors to invest the level of firm resources in fraud deterrence that 
shareholders would prefer. It may also be necessary “to overcome 
behavioral biases that lead directors to underestimate the likelihood 
that their CEO or other top officers would engage in fraud.”20 
Although shareholders have numerous weapons at their disposal for 
sanctioning directors who fail to advance their interests,21 those 
weapons cannot be deployed unless the infidelity is detected, and 
passive shareholders are poorly positioned to monitor directors’ 
efforts at fraud deterrence. 
Fraud-on-the-market class actions might be conceptualized as a 
way for shareholders to outsource this monitoring function to the 
class action bar. If, lured by the prospect of a large fee award, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys ferret out and publicize frauds that would 
 
 18.  See generally, Rose & Squire, supra note 17; Rose, supra note 16; Amanda M. Rose, 
Fraud on the Market: An Action Without a Cause, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 87 (2011). 
 19.  Rose, supra note 16, at 1255. 
 20.  Id. at 1256. 
 21.  For example, shareholders can “vote directors out of office, sue them for breach of 
fiduciary duty, or (most promising) take the so-called Wall Street Walk.” Id.  
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otherwise go undetected, Rule 10b-5 class actions may in fact produce 
valuable deterrence benefits. After all, when fraud is exposed, 
shareholders take notice and punishment swiftly follows. Individuals 
are fired, others suffer reputational damage, and a share sell-off is 
typically triggered, leading to a large drop in the firm’s stock price 
(which in turn impacts incentive compensation and increases the 
company’s vulnerability to a takeover). The threat of such punishment 
may, in turn, improve directors’ and officers’ ex ante incentives to 
invest in fraud deterrence. To the extent fraud-on-the-market class 
actions increase the likelihood of fraud detection, they should also 
help to deter would-be fraudsters in a more direct fashion. As I have 
previously argued, “[e]ven though [fraud-on-the-market] suits do not 
result in the imposition of monetary sanctions on culpable officers, to 
the extent they help detect frauds, they increase the likelihood that 
culpable officers will be sanctioned by both the government (perhaps 
even criminally) and by the firm itself.”22 
Importantly, it is the market-based, firm-based, and regulatory 
punishment that follows from the exposure of fraud that really does 
the deterrence work—not the monetary settlements that are 
ultimately paid in fraud-on-the-market class actions, which are 
basically just circular transfer payments.23 But the settlement payment 
is necessary because it creates the pool of funds from which the 
attorneys may be rewarded for their fraud detection efforts. 
To be sure, this theory of the social purpose of fraud-on-the-
market class actions raises some very important questions—namely, 
how well do class action attorneys actually do at exposing frauds, and 
are the costs associated with fraud-on-the-market class actions worth 
the informational benefits they produce? Before turning to these 
questions, however, let us first reconsider Halliburton’s impact on 
Rule 10b-5 class actions in light of their informational function. 
 
 
 22.  Id. at 1257. 
 23.  To be sure, if settlement payments are not covered by insurance, 
they, too, may impart punishment on the board through their impact on the value of 
directors’ shareholdings. But studies show that the bulk of the decline in a firm’s stock 
price upon the revelation of fraud is attributable to reputational loss rather than 
anticipated legal penalties. Thus, the deterrence value of [fraud-on-the-market] suits 
lies more in the information they produce about the underlying fraud than in the legal 
remedies they impose. 
Id. at 1256–57. 
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III.  THE FORM-DRIVEN INEFFICIENCIES OF FRAUD-ON-THE-
MARKET SUITS 
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court 
had the opportunity to reverse the course it took a quarter century 
ago by overruling Basic v. Levinson. It chose allegiance to the 
doctrine of stare decisis, reaffirming the Basic presumption of reliance 
while also making clear that defendants should have an opportunity 
to rebut it at the class certification stage by presenting evidence that 
the alleged misrepresentation did not actually impact the stock price.24 
The decision creates a host of new issues for lawyers to battle 
over. For example, what is the level of proof required to rebut the 
Basic presumption through evidence of lack of price impact?25 And 
what procedurally would the effect of such a rebuttal be?26 How 
should courts react when the evidence presented to rebut the 
presumption is relevant both to price impact and to the issue of 
materiality (which the Supreme Court held just two years before 
Halliburton may not be litigated at class certification27)? Should 
courts demand less from plaintiffs seeking to establish the Basic 
prerequisite of market efficiency, in light of statements in Halliburton 
that markets can be “generally efficient” while at the same time 
inefficiently processing certain types of information?28 
These questions will take much time and consume significant 
resources to resolve. And yet they are wholly unrelated to what 
actually matters in fraud-on-the-market litigation, once its true 
information-producing function is recognized. Shareholders and 
regulators are eager to learn whether corporate agents intentionally 
lied to the marketplace, so that they may dole out punishment as 
necessary. They do not care whether the prerequisites to class 
certification have been satisfied or if reliance or loss causation can 
been established. Yet these are the issues that consume a great deal of 
the judicial docket in fraud-on-the-market class actions. 
 
 24.  See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 25.  See, e.g., Merrit B. Fox, Halliburton II: It All Depends on What Defendants Need to 
Show to Establish No Impact on Price, BUS. LAW. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2488055.  
 26.  See, e.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, Answering Halliburton II’s Unanswered Question: 
Burdens of Production and Persuasion on Price Impact at Class Certification, SEC. REG. L.J. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2540348.  
 27.  See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
 28.  See Mark I. Gross, Class Certification in a Post-Halliburton World, LAW360 (July 21, 
2014, 10:47 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/558536/class-certification-in-a-post-
halliburton-ii-world. 
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The disconnect between the legal form and practical function of 
fraud-on-the-market class actions thus leads to considerable 
inefficiency, raising the question whether they ought to be replaced 
with an alternative information-production mechanism better suited 
to the task. 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Whether, on the whole, the informational benefits produced by 
fraud-on-the-market class actions outweigh their costs is a difficult 
empirical question to answer. But at least two things can be stated 
with confidence. First, a significant percentage of fraud-on-the-market 
class actions produce no informational benefits because they come 
only after other sources have publicly exposed the fraud and do not 
otherwise enrich the public’s understanding of what occurred.29 These 
“follow-on” suits represent a pure deadweight cost to society. Second, 
even the small percentage of fraud-on-the-market class actions that 
do reveal new and valuable information produce deadweight social 
costs to the extent the litigation focuses on the sort of irrelevant side-
issues discussed above.30 In light of this, it is worth considering 
whether a better mechanism for fraud detection might be devised. 
A full consideration of this issue would take us far beyond the 
scope of this symposium contribution. But let me conclude by briefly 
suggesting one possibility. As mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the SEC created the 
Whistleblower Bounty Program in 2011.31 This program requires the 
SEC to pay significant financial rewards to eligible individuals who 
voluntarily provide the agency with original information about 
securities law violations if that information leads to an enforcement 
action resulting in $1 million or more in sanctions.32 It is thus designed 
to provide financial incentives for individuals with knowledge of 
securities law violations to come forward to report it to the SEC. The 
program further seeks to encourage reporting by promising 
 
 29.  According to one academic study, private litigation uncovered only 3% of the 
incidents of financial fraud exposed between 1996 and 2004 in companies with more than $750 
million in assets. See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. 
FIN. 2213, 2230 (2010). 
 30.  See supra Part III. 
 31.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.A. (West 2015)). 
 32.  For an in depth description of the program’s requirements, see Rose, supra note 16 at 
1260–1272. 
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whistleblowers confidential treatment and providing them with a 
cause of action for employer retaliation.33 
In Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower 
Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate,34 I argue 
that the program is much better designed to elicit new information 
about corporate fraud than fraud-on-the-market class actions, and 
might serve as a template for the latter’s replacement. For example, 
unlike fraud-on-the-market class actions, the bounty program targets 
its rewards at individuals who actually produce new information 
about managerial malfeasance, and award determinations require 
consideration of none of the irrelevant issues commonly fought about 
in fraud-on-the-market suits. I further argue that the program is likely 
to reduce the informational benefits produced by fraud-on-the-
market class actions, whatever they may have been in the past. This is 
easy to see once one considers how class action attorneys—who are 
really outsiders to corporations with no special informational 
advantages—likely go about trying to detect frauds. 
There are two main possibilities. First, it may be that class action 
attorneys are effective at getting corporate insiders with knowledge to 
reveal information to them.35 But in the wake of the bounty program, 
those same insiders now have much more powerful incentives to 
report to the SEC. They have the promise of a large bounty payment, 
and also enjoy confidential treatment and legal protection against 
employer retaliation—benefits that do not flow from helping a class 
action lawyer. So the informants to class action attorneys of yesterday 
are very likely to become the SEC tipsters of today. 
Second, it is possible that class action attorneys have developed 
some expertise in examining and analyzing publicly available 
information to discover suspicious disclosure practices. But the 
bounty program rewards people who can do this, too—company 
outsiders who see things in publicly available information that others 
do not. This type of knowledge fits within the program’s definition of 
 
 33.  See id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  The heightened pleading requirements and discovery stay imposed on plaintiffs by the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act has led to heavy reliance by plaintiffs’ lawyers on 
confidential informants. See Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 551, 554 (2011) (“Allegations based on [information provided by confidential 
informants] often are the only specific allegations in a complaint supporting a claim of securities 
fraud.”). 
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“original information.”36 So class action attorneys can recover 
personally through the program, as can other market participants, if 
they share this sort of special fraud-detection capability. Again this 
means there will be less of this sort of fraud left for fraud-on-the-
market class action attorneys to expose. 
The one potential downside of the program is that, to function 
well, it requires that the SEC follow through on the tips it receives, 
and pay out bounties in a way that will encourage tips going forward. 
So far, the SEC’s administration of the program has been 
encouraging. Tips continue to pour in (over 3,600 in the 2014 fiscal 
year), and the SEC has handed out some impressive bounty awards 
(including a $30 million and $14 million award).37 But one might 
worry that this will change, and in the future ineffective 
administration of the program will operate to undermine its 
informational benefits. This concern does not, however, counsel in 
favor of retaining fraud-on-the-market suits. Rather, as detailed in 
Better Bounty Hunting, adding a qui tam provision to a dysfunctional 
bounty program would be a superior alternative to retaining fraud-
on-the-market suits.38 Such a provision would allow qualifying 
whistleblowers to bring suit on behalf of the government when the 
SEC fails to investigate a tip, and thus would maintain a private check 
on agency under-enforcement, but without the considerable 
inefficiencies associated with fraud-on-the-market suits. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Supreme Court recognized the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance in Basic v. Levinson, it created something 
quite distinct from the common law fraud cause of action that private 
Rule 10b-5 litigation had originally been modeled on. Indeed, fraud-
on-the-market class actions brought under Rule 10b-5 share none of 
the social virtues of common law fraud cases. If they are to be 
defended, it is because they help bring information about the 
wrongdoing of corporate agents to the attention of shareholders and 
regulators. But this information-production function is compromised 
by the outdated form of fraud-on-the-market class actions, a form that 
 
 36.  See Rose, supra note 16, at 1262. 
 37.  See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-
FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-
report-2014.pdf. 
 38.  See Rose, supra note 16, at 1290–1300. 
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rewards lawyers regardless of whether their cases bring new 
information to light and which requires expensive litigation over 
pointless issues. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Halliburton 
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. renders this situation worse, making 
more urgent the need to look for superior alternatives. One such 
alternative already exists—the SEC’s new Whistleblower Bounty 
Program. Unlike fraud-on-the-market class actions, the bounty 
program rewards only those individuals who actually bring forth new 
information about securities law violations, and requires resolution of 
none of the irrelevant issues that clog the judicial docket in fraud-on-
the-market cases. It thus has the distinct advantage of reconciling 
legal form with social function. 
 
